Resilient critical infrastructure and economic intelligence in the cyber domain by Laris Gaiser
RESILIENT CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE IN 
THE CYBER DOMAIN 
 
 






In the academia, as among the specialized 
public it is quite impossible to find a single, 
commonly accepted definition of economic 
intelligence. According to Jean and Savona, 
economic intelligence is the discipline that study 
information needed by companies and states to 
take the right development decisions with the 
aim of fine-tuning their cognitive and decision-
making capacities in the complex context of 
global competition (2011). The gathering and 
strategic management of information is a 
complex art with economic relevance and 
therefore businesses are forced to establish 
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their own business intelligence units. The 
efficiency of such units could be improved by 
appropriate cooperation at the state level, 
where national security agencies must adopt a 
decisive role both in terms of protecting and 
gathering information. Economic intelligence 
consists of gathering and processing 
information relevant to the economic sector with 
the aim of making operational choices. It 
consists of activities aimed at obtaining 
information, surveillance of competitors, 
protection of strategic information, and 
capitalising on this knowledge in order to 
influence, determine and control the global 
economic environment (Gaiser, 2016). 
Economic intelligence, however, is also the 
most refined and up-to-date version of the 
economic warfare and it also requires the 
protection of strategic infrastructure, i.e. the 
backbone of any economic system. The terrain 
of the economic struggle does not have the 
stability of the old political alliances. Economic 
challenges have minimised the room of 
manoeuvrability of military warfare, although the 
final objective of accumulating power and 
wealth, has remained unchanged. The fluidity of 
today’s international relations has forced 
countries to tackle global competition in such a 
way as to achieve the best possible outcome in 
terms of profits, development and wealth. 
Within such a framework, the countries return to 
be active co-protagonists of the economy, 
destined to catalyze and implement strategies 
of reform that allow the country-systems to 
remain competitive. The structures of economic 
intelligence are nothing other than the means, 
by which the public and private sectors can 
collaborate efficiently for the common 
wellbeing, in an historical period in which, if 



































  perish. In this way, the entrepreneurial sector 
maintains its vitality while the state rediscovers 
a new legitimizing mission (Gaiser, 2015). In 
the Nineteen-Eighties, Edward Luttwak 
announced the onset of a new world order, in 
which military warfare was to be replaced by 
economic weapons. Economic means are used 
by countries to increase their own clout and to 
have an impact on the balances of power. 
Military alliances and threats of war have lost 
some of their former strength (1993). Although 
Luttwak is right about the fact that countries 
tend to prefer power based on economic 
influence to territorial ambitions, which is 
considerably more sensible from a cost-benefit 
perspective, waged wars remain the ultima ratio 
regis of international politics. Economic warfare 
has given countries more options then waging 
into armed conflicts. This has—to some 
extent—loosened the interdependence between 
economy and war. This diverges from the 20th 
century, where the former was at service to the 
latter. As these borders expand over time, 
countries need to put in place their own 
economic intelligence units, because it is the 
tool they are forced to resort to, if they are to 
play on the new chessboard. 
Critical infrastructure and the cyber domain 
The context of economic activities in the past 
ten years has been radically transformed by an 
intense combination of technological 
innovations and geo-political confusion that 
have led to intense competition, greater 
interconnection, and unrestrained technological 
development. 
Living every day in a complex world, we realize 















































commercial wars, by infowars and by cyber 
wars. These end up characteristically being 
much less costly from the human point of view 
— meaning, more acceptable — but are often 
also more profitable. Economic wars are a 
reality in which information, knowledge and 
innovation are the raw materials, the 
international markets the frontline, while the 
failures of companies, unemployment, lack of 
public resources and the drop in the power of 
acquisition represent defeat. 
In the post-Clausewitzian logic, conflict does 
not require the destruction of the enemy: the 
goal of economic war becomes submitting the 
adversary with the least amount of expenditure 
of energies possible. Unlike military conflicts, 
which sooner or later face a time limit, 
economic conflicts have a permanent character. 
In addition, unlike codified military rules, the 
rules of economic competition and enterprise 
protection must be regularly updated and 
adapted to ongoing technological change. In an 
economy that is every day more connected and 
technologically dependent, the cyber domain is 
one of the most important frameworks of 
international competition. A framework of vital 
importance but, ironically, at the same time a 
framework of greatest vulnerability.  We have 
witnessed, ever since, a series of damaging 
actions caused by cyber warfare, a major 
security issue, a full-scale problem for the 
national security of various countries, especially 
when directed against critical infrastructure. At 
an international level, there are at least two 
generally accepted definitions. The first was 
given by NIST — the US National Institute of 
Standards and Technology —where critical 
infrastructure is defined as the “systems and 



































  the United States that the incapacity or 
destruction of such systems and assets would 
have a debilitating impact on security, national 
economic security, national public health or 
safety, or any combination of those matters.” 
Conversely, the second definition comes from 
the European Commission and describes CI as 
“physical structures of information technology, 
networks, services and goods that, if subjected 
to destruction or damage, would have a serious 
impact on the health, wellbeing, security or 
economic stability of the citizens, or on the 
function of the governments of the European 
Union.” The generic definition is supplemented 
by the one in Communication 702/2004 with the 
following more detailed list: 
(1) Energy installations and networks 
(e.g. electrical power, oil and gas 
production, storage facilities and 
refineries, transmission and 
distribution system)  
(2) Communications and Information 
Technology (e.g. 
telecommunications, broadcasting 
systems, software, hardware and 
networks including the Internet)  
(3) Finance (e.g. banking, securities 
and investment)  
(4) Health Care (e.g. hospitals, health 
care and blood supply facilities, 
laboratories and pharmaceuticals, 
search and rescue, emergency 
services)  
(5) Food (e.g. safety, production 
means, wholesale distribution and 















































(6) Water (e.g. dams, storage, 
treatment and networks)  
(7) Transport (e.g. airports, ports, 
intermodal facilities, railway and 
mass transit networks, traffic control 
systems)  
(8) Production, storage and transport of 
dangerous goods (e.g. chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear 
materials)  
(9) Government (e.g. critical services, 
facilities, information networks, 
assets and key national sites and 
monuments)  
 
Regardless of these two definitions, it should be 
noted that almost every country has its own 
mode of conceiving CI (see table below) and 
that such a large number of perceptions does 
not facilitate a comparative analysis of 
strategies or a holistic approach in addressing 
issues regarding the resilience of critical 
infrastructure. 
Almost every CI today is directly or indirectly 
connected to the cyber world. Such connection 
exponentially raises the system’s vulnerability. 
The diffusion of Internet and of information 
systems shortens the distances around the 
world, facilitates work, making everything faster, 
but at the same time leads to a paradoxical 
consequence, where the most informed and 
developed countries are also the most 
vulnerable ones. The knowledge of these 
vulnerabilities is the assumption of an effective 
strategy of cyber protection and information 



































  original sin of the insecurity of the information 
infrastructure can be recognized in the fact that 
the web—on which everything is based—was 
moulded in the beginning on the simplicity of 
open TCP/IP protocols, without system-
protection measures or auto-encryption, since 
simplicity and speed had to be guaranteed for 
the sake of efficiency and cost-effectiveness of 
the new tools. The digital economy was 
therefore born with a huge loophole. The logic 
of effectiveness has prevailed over that of 
national security. Today’s inadequate level of 
protection of digital technologies poses a strong 
challenge for economic development and a 
heavy burden to social stability. The same 
technological innovations that have brought 
many benefits to our society can now be 
exploited by enemy countries to carry out 
cyber-attacks with disastrous consequences. 
Information technology networks act as 
multipliers and generators of economic and 
military power. According to Prof. Umberto Gori 
almost one third of SCADA systems has 
already been infiltrated (2015). Attacks to 
critical infrastructure (CI) are constantly growing 
and represent the greatest challenge to our 
cognitive bias, since the nature of future attacks 
is just anyone’s guess. Last year Clusit reported 
that in 2015 cyber-attacks against CI increased 
by 153% compared with 2014. 
Contrary to the general opinion, individual 
hackers do not bring serious threats to national 
critical infrastructure and therefore policy 
makers and common citizens must understand 
that such projects cannot be the domain of lone 
wolves. 
Cyberwars are state’s coordinated actions 















































of another state with the purpose of causing 
damage or malfunction (Clark 2010). Cyber 
weapons exploit software and hardware 
vulnerabilities to gain access to critical targets. 
Cyberwar is highly unpredictable, fast and 
dynamic, since it annihilates the strategic 
values of distance, time and borders. In the 
cyber domain it is practically impossible to send 
notifications in time, mostly because the 
“warriors” wage attacks, whose origin, load and 
possible effects are hard to pinpoint. In 1999, 
Chinese Colonels Liang and Xiangsui argued 
that wars are about to become perennial and 
unlimited. The international system is moving 
from a time of war to an era of war. Cyberwar 
shares many characteristics with aerial war, as 
defined in the 1930s by the theories of aerial 
supremacy and as actually implemented on the 
battle fields. From a tactical point of view, the 
goal of aerial warfare is to destroy the vital 
infrastructure of an enemy country, making it 
difficult to maintain the war effort and threating 
the livelihood of the civil population. Strategic 
bombardments of industrial structures, 
production plants, pathways of communication 
and supply, or aerial recognitions, are all 
activities that are easily assimilated to the 
extreme goals of modern cybernetic warfare to 
the CI with which the adversaries seek to seize 
secrets or hinder the normal functioning of a 
country. Depending on the operative means 
chosen, cyberwar may have both tactical and 
strategic goals. Nevertheless, aerial war and 
cyberwar are also similar for another reason: 
just as Alexander de Seversky noted in his 
fundamental work on the theory of aerial power, 
Victory Through Air Power, in 1942, in which he 
underlines how the preferred objectives for this 
type of war are the countries with a developed 




































                    
cybernetic war: The countries with 
underdeveloped systems of communication, 
transport or production are more immune than 
the more developed ones, which are 
consequently more vulnerable to air attacks or, 
today, to cyber infiltrations. 
Table 1: Examples of taxonomies2 
 
Security dilemmas and IC resilience 
Given the dual nature of the cyber domain, 
which is physical and virtual, offense has 
always an advantage over defence. Every 
potential player is inclined to act in an offensive 
way. According to Libicki, a dollar spent in 
offense equals far more than a single dollar 
spent in defence, if we are to restore the 
previous levels of security (2009). The dilemma 
 















































of security—which we could define as the 
offensive non-equilibrium of the cybernetic 
system—is a problem of non-secondary 
importance for the future economic stability of 
the more developed countries, but most of all, it 
is a problem of pure balance of powers given 
how difficult it is to determine the place of origin 
of the attacks, which consequently diminishes 
the possibilities of reprisal. The Internet was 
born as a multiplier of power, in which the 
activities of defence are highly vulnerable also 
because the CI, for lack of pressure in the past, 
was often created without paying attention to 
redundancy systems or even duplicating or 
triplicating the control apparatus and 
procedures which could ensure the system 
remains operational even in the case of 
aggression. 
Infrastructure resilience is the ability to reduce 
the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive 
events. The effectiveness of a resilient 
infrastructure or enterprise depends upon its 
ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or 
rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive 
event. Resilience is a multifaceted issue 
involving security, risk management, business 
continuity and crisis management. One of the 
aspects that makes infrastructure (security) 
administration particularly complicated is the 
fact that, while the security of citizens relies on 
law enforcement structures, many pieces of 
critical infrastructure are owned or managed by 
the private sector. When speaking of security 
and resilience of CI, it is necessary to keep in 
mind that a public-private partnership is strongly 
needed here: an adequate level of cyber 
security can only be pursued through a broad 
collaboration among all the stakeholders. 



































  present or a foreseeable situation. It is the 
fundamental management of any type of 
vulnerability and the adaptability of a structure, 
namely the ability to mutate the factors that 
define equilibriums such as strategy, operating 
systems, decision-making and command 
structures. 
There is no need to emphasize that the 
strategies and resilience techniques must adapt 
to the various infrastructure sectors. 
Specialized literature offers us as many 
definitions of resilience as there are 
infrastructure systems in order to create 
quantitative models for measuring the resilience 
to disruptive events, to assess the impacts on 
system performance and to calculate the 
recovery costs. 
A complete and successful resilience strategy 
should always consider that CI is composed not 
only by technology but by people, processes 
and organizations, as well. Specific cultural 
backgrounds make each system unique.  
The English term intelligence derives from the 
Latin word intelligere, composed of the 
preposition inter, between, and legere, to read. 
Intelligere therefore signifies to read between 
the lines, to understand beyond the surface, to 
stabilize the relationship between the elements. 
The current definition of intelligence is thus the 
reasoning, planning, learning, and coming up 
with solutions to problems. Moreover, it should 
be recalled that for the German philosopher and 
psychologist William L. Stern, intelligence was 
none other than “the general capacity to adapt 
one’s own thought and behaviour in the face of 















































The economic intelligence systems around the 
world should adapt their national economic 
frameworks to tackle the challenges of hybrid 
warfare. Resilience, more than the sum of all 
the processes needed, becomes a cultural 
approach that must involve the entire society. 
Critical infrastructure is almost synonymous to 
national economy and national security. Since 
governments are generally responsible for both, 
they are also responsible for delivering cyber 
strategies to protect infrastructure. It is a 
question of national governance, whose aim 
shall be to establish strong security tools for the 
national economy. 
Resilience has a series of technical, personal, 
organizational and co-operational aspects and 
consequently a series of capacities: predictive, 
absorptive, reactive and restorative, which 
imply the required tools of resilience: 
redundancy, robustness and segregation. 
Resilience is a complex issue tightly linked with 
prevention, since it must be based on the 
mental presumption that we cannot foresee the 
exact nature of future cyber-attacks and we can 
never exclude a black swan event. If prevention 
is—by its very definition— composed of active 
and passive moments and if only the 
governments have all the tools needed to 
successfully organize public-private 
partnerships, it would be sensible for 
intelligence agencies to act within the logic of 
economic intelligence, i.e. to act as national 
hubs coordinating active and passive policies. 
The seven mitigating mechanisms still valid 
today consist of creating awareness, reducing 
dependency, increasing redundancy, 
developing back-up alternatives, increasing 
flexibility, transferring risk and sharing 



































  survive and maintain their historical roles, they 
should turn into business-friendly service 
platforms guaranteeing legal and infrastructural 
support to companies. Internationally 
competitive companies represent internationally 
competitive countries. Efficient information 
sharing between state-managed intelligence 
agencies and private business-intelligence units 
is absolutely needed to shape a new security 
culture as well as to guarantee a sound 
economy. Without private-public partnerships 
there is no efficient resilience. 
Conclusions 
There are no doubts about today’s existence of 
multinational economic groups or small, 
ungoverned organisations that—if properly 
coordinated among themselves—can detain a 
highly penetrating and therefore undeniable 
power. The importance of territory for the fate of 
countries has changed dramatically over the 
years. Nevertheless, the ‘sovereigns’ have 
shown the ability to adapt and revise the 
concept of ‘State’, which is currently better 
described by the term ‘country-system’, in 
which the economic and social ties represent 
the fundamental adhesive for redefining the 
boundaries and the equilibriums of a nation. 
Countries that are unable to be competitive—
having no solid, safe and critical 
infrastructure—are doomed to succumb to 
others or become non-influential on a world 
scale. International competition has grown 
strongly and therefore country-systems need 
more sophisticated, precise and organized 
means to preserve their credibility, attract 
investments, remain structurally stable and 















































these aspects, we could divide nations into 
three categories: the ones with an economic-
intelligence system, the ones intending to adopt 
one, and the ones that will probably never have 
a similar system for an array of different 
reasons. While the first ones are in a position of 
overwhelming advantage, those in the second 
category still have a chance of not being 
completely subdued. Both will, however, exploit 
the weaknesses of ill-prepared nations, which 
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